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the appropriate layers and interleaved the appropriate control
process at just the right time to ensure that each of the necessary
relations was picked out in turn. How else could it be that the
model never cycled through the same relation twice, or searched
for a nonexistent element and became stuck?
In contrast, structural alignment assumes that inferences involve
facts from the base that are connected to matching higher-order
relations between base and target (Clement & Gentner 1991).
This systematic relational structure and the preference for systema-
ticity thus provide constraints on inferences such that structural
accounts can function even with rich natural concepts and
without any external direction. In addition, the inferences can
easily be incorporated into the representation of the target domain.
The authors of the target article try to head off criticisms of this
variety by suggesting that explicit mappings (and presumably infer-
ences) could be carried out by different processes than the more
implicit processes that find correspondences between domains.
The authors use the example of semantic priming in language to
illustrate their point. If their suggestion turns out to be correct,
then it is those processes that could form the basis for a new
theory of analogy. Therefore, the theory posited by the authors
may help us to understand some of the sub-processes that are
recruited during analogical processing, but it is not actually a
theory of analogical processing itself. Indeed, it is worth noting
that semantic priming is not taken to be a theory of language;
rather, it is understood to be a sub-process that is used in language.
If there were no computational models of analogical reasoning
that encompassed both mapping and inference processes, and if
those models had never been applied to both developmental and
adult data, then it might be reasonable to divide these processes
into separate components and assume that two distinct models
are required to account for them. However, models like the Struc-
ture-Mapping Engine (SME) (Falkenhainer et al. 1989) and Learn-
ing and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA) (Hummel &
Holyoak 1997) are designed to account for both analogical mapping
and inference, and both models are able to make use of higher-
order relations in their domain representations. Furthermore, as
the target article notes, SME has been applied to developmental
tasks (Gentner et al. 1995). Thus, it seems unparsimonious to
assume that analogical reasoning abilities begin with processes
that cannot ultimately perform the variety of tasks that are clearly
part of the repertoire of older children and adults.
Although a developmental approach to analogy has the poten-
tial to offer great value, it must ultimately point the way toward
adult analogical competence in order to actually deliver that
value. That is, to be a successful developmental account, a
theory must begin at a reasonable starting point and demonstrate
the path/process through which the system progresses to reach
the known end state. The ARP theory does not explain full com-
petence, and cannot, in principle, be extended to do so without it
becoming a part of a larger theory.
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Abstract: Analogy employs a neurocognitive working-memory (WM)
system to activate and bind relational representations, integrate
multiple relations, and suppress distracting information. Analogy
experiments exploring these processes have used a variety of methodologies
including dual tasks, neuropsychology, and functional neuroimaging, as
well as experiments with children and older adults. Collectively, these
experiments provide a rich set of results useful in evaluating any model
of analogy and its development.
Analogy involves a structured comparison, or mapping, between
one situation (source) and another (target). For instance, a rea-
soner may be given a problem such as:
bird:nest::bear: ? _
and be asked which word, CAVE or HONEY, completes
the analogy. To choose CAVE, the participant would need to
realize that birds live in nests as bears live in caves while not
being distracted by the fact that bears eat honey. Using
several priming tasks, Spellman et al. (2001) investigated
whether analogy might just be a consequence of the organiz-
ation of concepts in semantic memory. They found that unlike
traditional semantic priming, “analogical” priming was not auto-
matic and instead required the participant to direct attention to
relations between word pairs. This suggested that controlled
retrieval of a bound relation into working memory (WM) may
be a necessary process for analogical reasoning. Subsequent
experiments demonstrated that WM was indeed important for
analogical mapping (e.g., Morrison et al. 2001), as well as rela-
tional binding (see Morrison 2005), a finding confirmed using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Bunge et al.
2005).
WM is also important for suppressing distracting information,
such as irrelevant semantic associates or featural similarities
likely to enter WM during analogical retrieval and mapping.
Waltz et al. (2000) demonstrated that adults performing a seman-
tically rich scene-analogy task shifted from preferring analogical
to featural mappings under WM dual-tasks. Using the same task,
Morrison et al. (2004) found that frontal patients with damage to
WM areas showed a similar pattern. Morrison et al. also devel-
oped an A:B::C:D or D0 verbal analogy task that required partici-
pants to choose between D (analogically correct choice) and D0
(foil), which were both semantically related to the C term of
the analogy. When the foil was more semantically associated to
the C term than was the correct choice, frontal patients per-
formed near chance. In contrast, semantic dementia patients
who exhibited profound decrements in relational knowledge
performed poorly on all of the verbal analogies regardless
of the degree of semantic association between C:D and C:D0.
Using the same task, Cho et al. (2007b) found that individuals
who scored higher on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM)
showed greater fMRI activation increase in neural areas,
including the prefrontal and visual cortices, on trials in which rea-
soners had to reject foils that were highly associated with the C
term. This finding suggests that there are neural regions whose
level of activation for interference resolution during analogical
reasoning relates to individual differences in fluid intellectual
capacity.
Many real-world analogies, as well as reasoning tasks devel-
oped for psychometric purposes such as the RPM and People
Pieces Analogy task (PPA; Sternberg 1977b), require integration
of multiple relations to map more relationally complex analo-
gies. Numerous fMRI studies (e.g., Christoff et al. 2001;
Kroger et al. 2002) have shown increasing levels of activation
in anterior prefrontal cortex for more relationally complex
RPM problems, a finding consistent with a neuropsychological
study with frontal patients (Waltz et al. 1999). Using an adap-
tation of the PPA task, Viskontas et al. (2004) found that
older adults showed decrements in both relational integration
and relational distraction. Using this same task, Cho et al.
(2007a) found that executive resources are shared between rela-
tional integration and interference resolution during analogical
reasoning. In an fMRI follow-up study, Cho et al. (2007c)
found partially overlapping but distinct regions within inferior
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frontal gyri (IFG) showing sensitivity to each component
process of analogical reasoning. Separate regions that showed
exclusive sensitivity to each component process were also
identified within IFG. In addition, the degree of activation
increase in the right ventral IFG during trials in which partici-
pants had to integrate three relations (compared to one)
was greater for individuals whose performance accuracy was
higher.
Although the above studies do not directly deal with the
development of analogy during childhood, they do clearly
demonstrate several component processes involved in analogical
reasoning that are dependent on prefrontal cortex, an area of the
brain that actively develops throughout childhood (Diamond
2002). In an effort to explore these processes directly in chil-
dren, Richland et al. (2006) developed a scene-analogy task
manipulating both relational complexity and featural distraction.
Even 3-year-olds could solve simple (one-relation, no-distraction)
problems, but they had difficulty if the problem required inte-
gration of multiple relations or ignoring a featurally similar
object. Similarly, Wright et al. (2007) performed an fMRI
study with children using another semantically rich visual
analogy task, and found that brain activation in areas associated
with relational integration was the best predictor of analogy
performance. Wright et al. also found that these areas, which
are not associated with semantic retrieval (Bunge et al. 2005),
become more and more engaged over the same time period
in which children dramatically improve in their ability to solve
more relationally complex problems (Richland et al. 2006).
We are highly sympathetic with the target article’s efforts to
computationally model the development of analogy, and we cer-
tainly don’t dispute the importance of relational knowledge in
development. However, we believe that a successful model of
development must (1) explain how knowledge representation
and process constraints interact to produce the changes in
analogy observed in children, including increases in ability to
perform relational integration and resist featural distraction;
and (2) explain how an architecture consistent with the
demands of adult analogical reasoning develops. Unfortunately,
the connectionist model described in the target article does not
meet these requirements. In contrast, Morrison and collabor-
ators have used LISA (Learning and Inference with Schemas
and Analogies; Hummel & Holyoak 1997; 2003), a neurally plaus-
ible model of analogical reasoning, to successfully simulate many
of the developmental and neuropsychological results discussed in
this commentary (e.g., Morrison et al. 2004; 2006; Viskontas et al.
2004).
We believe that the development of analogical reasoning is
best conceptualized as an equilibrium between children’s rela-
tional knowledge and their current processing ability. As children
mature, their prefrontal cortices more efficiently implement WM
and thereby can process more complex analogies. However,
more efficient relational representations can impose fewer pro-
cessing demands at any given age, which is why a child who
becomes an expert in a given domain can show rapid progress
even though the child’s WM system has not improved (Morrison
et al. 2007). This framework can account for the observed
changes in children’s analogical reasoning, as well as subsequent
changes in analogy during normal and abnormal human aging. It
can also be simulated in symbolic-connectionist models of rela-
tional learning and reasoning (e.g., Doumas et al. 2008;
Hummel & Holyoak 1997; 2003).
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Relational priming plays a supporting but not
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Abstract: Leech et al.’s analysis adds to an emerging consensus of the
role of priming in analogy-making. However, their model cannot scale
up to adult-level performance because not all relations can be cast as
functions. One-size-fits-all accounts cannot capture the richness of
analogy. Proportional analogies and transitive inferences can be made
by nonstructural mechanisms. Therefore, these tasks do not generalize
to tasks that require structure mapping.
Leech et al. argue forcefully that adult-level models of analogy-
making must make contact with the developmental constraint.
This argument cuts both ways: Developmental models must
also make contact with adult-level capability. We argue that
although relational priming does play a role in adult analogical
reasoning, it does not play the leading role that Leech et al.
suggest.
Relational priming. The role of priming in analogical reasoning
is well documented empirically (e.g., Kokinov 1990; Schunn &
Dunbar 1996). It also features prominently in several models,
including Associative Memory-Based Reasoning (AMBR)
(Kokinov 1994; Kokinov & Petrov 2001) and Copycat (French
1995; Hofstadter 1984; Mitchell 1993). All of these models
implement priming as residual activation. The present proposal
thus adds to an emerging consensus of the importance of
priming and of its underlying mechanism.
Not all relations can be cast as functions. Leech et al. claim
that “for the purposes of analogy it may be sufficient to concep-
tualize relations as transformations between items” (sect. 2.2,
para. 2). The main idea is to cast each binary relation R(a,b) as
an equivalent univariate function1 b ¼ FR(a). The model uses
hand-coded representations, rep, such that rep(FR(a)) ¼ rep(a)þ
FR(a)) ¼ rep(a)þ rep(R). The authors argue this is beneficial
because “relations do not have to be represented explicitly, avoid-
ing the difficulties of learning explicit structured representations”
(sect. 5.1.1, para. 1). However, this benefit comes at the cost of
rendering the model incapable of scaling up to adult-level
performance.
The problem is that a relation can be cast as a function only if it
is deterministic: that is, if for each a there is precisely one b that
satisfies R(a,b) (Halford et al. 1998). Many important relations
violate this condition. Consider the transitive inference task: tal-
ler(Ann,Beth), taller(Beth,Chris)! taller(Ann,Chris). Now, if
the relation taller(a,b) is cast as a function b ¼ shrink(a), the
query shrink(Ann) ¼ ? becomes ambiguous. There are tech-
niques for supporting nondeterministic functions in connection-
ist networks (e.g., Hinton & Sejnowski 1986) that can be
incorporated into the model. However, the priming account
faces a deeper challenge: Why should Chris be produced as
the answer to the above query after the system has been
primed with Beth ¼ shrink(Ann)?
Many relationships in the world are indeed near-deterministic
transformations such as bread! cut bread. It is an important
developmental constraint that young children find such regular,
familiar relations easier to deal with (e.g., Goswami & Brown
1989). These strong environmental regularities shape coarse-
coded distributed representations that can support generaliz-
ation and inference (Cer & O’Reilly 2006; Hinton 1990; Rogers
& McClelland 2004; St. John & McClelland 1990). The target
article demonstrates the utility of relational priming in these
cases. However, there are also relationships such as left of that
are quite accidental and changeable. To process them, the
brain relies on sparse conjunctive representations (McClelland
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